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CHAPTER 43 
FROM COMPETITION TO SYMBIOSIS 
Commercial Context and Commercial Law 
and their Importance in Legal Education 
1. INTRODUCTION 
The ultimate good desired is better reached by free trade in ideas [and] the 
best test of truth is the power of the thought to get itself accepted in the 
competition of the market.1 
This quotation by Oliver Wendell Holmes seems well suited when the purpose is 
to honour Professor Bergsten and his outstanding role in the advancement of 
uniform commercial law and its study. For despite his major achievements, either 
academic (his professorship at Pace University or numerous publications) or 
institutional (as Secretary General of the UNCITRAL or Chairman of the CISG-
Advisory Council) the role we want to emphasize, as we feel it more closely, is 
his shepherding of the Willem C Vis International Commercial Arbitration Moot 
from its beginning to the present time, when it has turned into the biggest student 
competition by international presence2.  
 
The Vis Moot experience, as well as other moots is based on the assumption that 
discussion and debate are the best way to teach a subject such as law, since the 
best ideas are those accepted after a competitive process. This was Holmes’ 
 
* Professor Dr Perales Viscasillas is Chair of Commercial Law at University of La Rioja and Dr 
Ramos Muñoz is Assistant Professor at University Carlos III of Madrid. The present work is 
written under the Research Project of the Ministry of Science and Technology (Spain) 
(DER2008-02244/JURI): Uniform International Commercial Law and its impact on European 
Contract Law: UNIDROIT Principles 2004 and International Commercial Arbitration under 
UNCITRAL. Head of the team: Prof. Pilar Perales Viscasillas. 
1  O.W. Holmes. Dissenting opinion in Abrams v. United States, 250 U.S. 616 (1919). 
2 In 2010 there were 251 teams. See http://www.cisg.law.pace.edu/cisg/moot/participants17.html 
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dictum, this was also John Stuart Mill’s main argument for his passionate 
defence of freedom of speech3. In this regard the competition of ideas in the 
Moot has been an invaluable tool to expand the teaching and research of uniform 
law. 
 
And yet the topic of this article points towards an aspect of uniform law where 
competition (or a “competitive approach”) may have had some questionable 
effects, some which Professor Bergsten’s ingenuity has helped to uncover. 
 
In uniform commercial law the principle of party autonomy is paramount. 
However, the way this principle is contemplated places it in an almost invariably 
“competitive” relationship with the law. As such, the parties’ will must either 
comply with, or derogate from the legal rules, without any space for it to interact 
with or supplement them. Such an approach can potentially lead to a vacuum 
when the parties’ will is to some extent inconsistent with legal provisions; but 
insufficient to fill the gap left by those overridden provisions. It can also lead to 
the discarding of factual elements that show the commercial context in which the 
parties operate because they do not fulfil the test to be considered “parties’ will”, 
“practices” or “usages”. 
 
We believe that the “competitive” solution can perilously lead to the neglect of 
the commercial context (which is wider than what the legal categories of “will”, 
“practices” or “usages” acknowledge), and the interaction between that context 
and the law. It is for this reason that, as opposed to what we label the 
“competitive” approach we offer a “symbiotic” approach, which we describe in 
general terms in Section II. The relationship between this academic contribution 
and the role of Professor Bergsten cannot be more evident, since it has been 
through his creativity in designing the Vis Moot problems that we have realized 
about some of the ideas that we express in this work; as the practical applications 
of our approach under section III clearly reflect. 
 
3  John Stuart Mill, Utilitarianism, Liberty, and representative Government (London: J.M. Dent & 
Sons Ltd.; New York: E.P. Dutton & Co. Inc., 1910), p. 82. 
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2. COMMERCIAL CONTEXT, COMMERCIAL LAW AND ITS INFLUENCE IN LEGAL 
EDUCATION – VIS MOOT AS A BEGINNING 
2.1. Commercial Context and Commercial Relationships 
The evolution of commercial law in its origins was closely tied to that of 
commercial practice; particularly to merchant practice and usages of trade. In 
those times the practice and usages were was primarily that of traders, who 
purchased the goods that were transported from port to port, or made at local 
fairs. 
 
The mass of those commercial transactions were concluded over commodities; 
whose main characteristic is that they can be easily described. This, in turn, 
facilitated that parties in very distant spots of the planet could transact over great 
amounts of those commodities4. This standardization allowed the development of 
“markets” where the whole lot of transactions was simplified in “supply” and 
“demand”, “price” and “quantity”. What is equally important, the simplicity of 
the elements involved made it easy to predict the parties’ typical behaviour in the 
transaction (offer, acceptance, transportation, handing over, examination, 
notification, etc); and, with that behavioural pattern in mind, to formulate the 
legal rules accordingly. 
 
With that paradigm in mind classical economics evolved, without paying 
attention to the phenomenon of corporations; which were also evolving from tiny 
legal forms to colossal behemoths that encompassed within them transactions 
comparable in volume to those taking place in the market between firms. 
Corporations thus grew as alternative organizational forms to the market; the 
choice depending on the relative level of transaction costs between market and 
non-market transactions5. 
 
 
4  According to Marshall, commodities are  
...all those things for which there is a very wide market are in universal demand, and 
capable of being easily and exactly described. Thus for instance cotton, wheat, and iron 
satisfy wants that are urgent and nearly universal. They can be easily described, so that 
they can be bought and sold by persons at a distance from one another and at a distance 
also from the commodities. 
Alfred Marshall, Principles of Economics (New York: Prometheus Books, 1997), 142. 
5  Ronald Coase, ‘The Nature of the Firm’, Economica 4, 386-405; Ronald Coase, ‘The Problem 
of Social Cost’, Journal of Law and Economics 3 (1960). 
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And, in a third step of evolution, traders and businessmen realized that firms and 
markets were but the opposite poles of a broad spectrum of organizational forms; 
where the elements of price, hierarchy and cooperation were combined in 
different ways and quantities to fit the needs of the specific activity undertaken. 
As products and services grew in variety, complexity and sophistication, so did 
the different forms that permitted businessmen to suit clients’ demands and boost 
profitability. The market-firm dichotomy had thus given rise to complex and 
long-term relationships of supply, agency, franchise, consortium, pools, best-
friends, etc6, giving rise to the new concepts such as “network”7. 
 
Now such an evolution has been well accounted for in the strategic management 
(and also economics) literature; but the raise of these new forms of cooperation 
also influences the behaviour and mutual expectations of the parties; and, with 
that, the disputes that may arise between them. The question, then, must be 
whether the law has kept up with the demands of its role as a problem-solving 
tool; or, rather, it has left its structures to stiffen. 
 
In this regard, “typical”, “traditional” or “classical” contract law has been, to 
some extent, shaped by the commodities sale transaction in mind. This is 
manifest in the common law characterization of a contract as a promise8. A 
promise clearly involves what, in the contractual context, has been called 
“presentiation”, which means restricting the expected future effects of the 
contract to those defined in the present9. This element is also present in civil law 
countries, where the notion of obligation, and the legal definitions of the different 
contractual types embody the idea of parties committing themselves to do 
 
6  Robert M. Grant, Contemporary Strategy Analysis 5th ed. (United Kingdom: Blackwell 
Publishing, 2005), 404. 
7  Ranjay Gulati, Nitin Nohria, Akbar Zaheer, ‘Strategic Networks’, Strategic Management 
Journal 21(3) (March 2000): 203. 
8  Restatement Second (on Contracts) Section § 1: 
A contract is a promise, or a set of promises, for breach of which the law gives a remedy, 
or the performance of which the law in some way recognizes as a duty. 
9  Ian R. Macneil, ‘Contracts: Adjustment of Long-Term Economic Relations under Classical, 
Neoclassical, and Relational Contract Law’, Northwestern University Law Review 72 (1978): 
862. 
P. Perales Viscasillas & D. Ramos Muñoz: From Competition to Symbiosis 
777 
something in the future10. To some extent, this idea is reinforced by the legal 
requirement that the price be set in the contract11. 
 
In addition to this idea of “presentiation”, some have identified as another feature 
of “traditional” contract law the idea of “discreteness”; which, to some extent, 
involves the isolation and commoditization of the exchange involved in the 
transaction from its context, thereby considering the parties’ relationship as 
irrelevant, as well as the other elements (e.g. parties’ identity, expectations) that 
may have led to the transaction in the first place12. It also implies formulating 
strict rules that determine when a contract exists, and dismissing all other 
situations as legally irrelevant13. 
 
The authors that have more fervently advocated the need that modern contract 
law accounts for the complexities of new forms of business intercourse are 
Professors Macneil and Macaulay; whose view focuses on the relationship of the 
parties as the legally relevant (flowing) element, which shapes the different 
orders or requests (and which would otherwise be considered the contracts) that 
may sprout as the milestones in that relationship14. 
 
 
10  See article 1445 of the Spanish Civil code, which defines the contract of sale as one where a 
party “obliges itself”, or binds itself, to deliver a determined thing, and the other to pay a certain 
price for it. See also article 1582 of the French Civil code.  
11  Article 1445 of the Spanish Civil code for the condition that the price must be “certain”. 
12 See Macneil, supra note 9, 856: 
To implement discreteness, classical law initially treats as irrelevant the identity of the 
parties to the transaction. Second, it transactionizes or commodifies as much as possible 
the subject matter of contracts, e.g., it turns employment into a short-term commodity by 
interpreting employment contracts without express terms of duration as terminable at will. 
Third, it limits strictly the sources to be considered in establishing the substantive content 
of the transaction. [...] Fourth, only limited contracts remedies are available, so that the 
initial presentation fall to materialize because of nonperformance, the consequences are 
relatively predictable from the beginning and are not open-ended, as they would be, for 
example, if damages for unforeseeable or psychic losses were allowed.  
13 See ibid., who says that:  
Fifth, classical contract law draws clear lines between being and not being in a 
transaction; e.g., rigorous and precise rules of offer and acceptance prevail with no half-
way houses where only some contract interests are protected or where losses are shared. 
Finally, the introduction of third parties into the relation is discouraged since multiple 
poles of interest tend to create discreteness-destroying relations. 
14 Stewart Macaulay, ‘Non-Contractual Relations in Business: A Preliminary Study’, American 
Sociological Review 28(1) (February 1963): 28; Macneil, supra note 9, 863. 
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The trouble with the “relational” view is somehow its lack of determination and 
definiteness. It is hard to conclude whether we can talk of a “relational” view of 
contracts, or of a view applicable only to “relational” contracts; and which would 
be its consequences in terms of the specific solutions offered for issues of 
formation, performance, non-performance, remedies, or third party intervention. 
Furthermore, despite the merit of these views in having spotted the need to adjust 
to new commercial realities, most of statutory commercial law has not been 
altered to encompass a more relational view, or to account for it in specific 
contexts.  
 
In the absence of specific provisions, the travails to adjust current commercial 
law to commercial reality are even more difficult, since they largely involve an 
interpretative task. That task requires fitting a business reality of complex 
relationships into a legal order whose underlying assumptions may often widely 
diverge from that reality.  
2.2. How to Account For Commercial Context in Commercial Law. Is it Enough? 
Given that existing statutory rules were drafted with a traditional view of contract 
(involving presentiation and discreteness) in mind, the process of adjustment will 
require of all the flexibility that contract law can admit. In this regard, we are 
lucky, since uniform law; which constitutes our subject of analysis, is rich in 
legal tools that allow for the necessary flexibility.  
 
First of all, let us take the provisions of uniform texts dealing with the core 
principle of party autonomy. The 1980 United Nations Convention on Contracts 
for the International Sale of Goods (hereafter CISG), somehow the flagship text 
of uniform contract law, provides in its Article 6 that: 
The parties may exclude the application of this Convention or, subject to 
article 12, derogate from or vary the effect of any of its provisions. 
The UNIDROIT Principles split the principle in two, stating, as a more general 
provision, that the parties are free to enter into a contract and to determine its 
content15, and then, that this freedom includes the freedom to exclude the 
application of the Principles, and/or derogate or vary their effect16. A similar 
 
15  Article 1.1 UPIC. 
16  Article 1.5 UPIC. 
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approach is present in PECL17. This suggests that contract law must serve the 
interests of the parties, rather than the other way around. 
 
Such rules, however, are perfectly suited for cases where the parties have taken 
the trouble of engaging in a protracted negotiation and drafting process, with 
long and detailed clauses that regulate their relationship. Conversely, it is often 
the case that business parties do not to check every step they make with their 
lawyers, for that would stiffen their dealings. Rather, they rely on the mutual 
understanding of what the parties consider they must do, and what they are 
entitled to expect. These expectations may not arise from the letter of the 
contract; but, rather, from the general context of the parties’ economic sector, or 
the parties’ specific course of conduct in their concrete relationship. 
 
Such elements can also be accounted for in the uniform texts. First, because all of 
the texts considered here embody an anti-formalistic approach, and thereby do 
not require the written form (or any other type of form) for an act or a statement 
to be legally relevant18. Second, because all uniform texts include comprehensive 
rules for the interpretation of the meaning and significance of the parties’ 
statements and conduct; which adequately account for the “context” mentioned 
above. 
 
More specifically, in weighing a party’s statements or conduct interpretation 
rules give primary relevance to the parties’ actual intention, provided the other 
party could not have been unaware of that intention19. Seemingly, a contract is to 
be interpreted pursuant to the common intention of the parties, provided it can be 
established20. If the actual intention cannot be established, the default rule relies 
on the interpretation that a reasonable person of the same kind and in the same 
circumstances would make21 . And, which is even more important for our 
purposes, to supplement those rules, to help in establishing either the actual intent 
or the understanding of a reasonable person, regard must be had to all relevant 
circumstances22.  
 
 
17  Article 1.1 (1) and (2) PECL. 
18  See article 11 of the CISG, or article 1.2 UPIC.  
19  Article 8 (1) CISG, article 4.2 (1) UPIC, article 5:101 (2) PECL. 
20  Article 4.1 (1) UPIC, article 5:101 (1) PECL. 
21  Article 8 (2) CISG, articles 4.1 (2) and 4.2 (2) UPIC, and articles 5:101 (3) 
22  Article 8 (3) CISG, article 4.3 UPIC, article 5:102 PECL. 
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This reference allows to insufflate life into what would otherwise be inert black 
letter. It places the parties’ statements in a context, composed by a wide array of 
elements, from the more general (usages, and meaning of terms in the trade 
concerned) to the more specific (parties’ practices); accounting for the contract’s 
past events (negotiations), as well as its projection into the future (subsequent 
conduct)23. Even if other rules rely on the contract as a spot transaction, these 
provisions put that spot within space and time coordinates24. As a corollary of 
this, the “elements” relevant for interpretation also include the “nature and 
purpose of the contract”25. This implicitly assumes that, even if the “contract” is 
still the legally significant unit in uniform law, it may still form part of a greater 
design, embedded into a longer and wider relationship that vests it with purpose. 
 
And yet we believe these tools may still be insufficient to address the problem 
envisaged in this work. If one thinks about it, these rules are perfect if the 
problem arises in the way the parties express their intention. However, they are 
inadequate when the problem is in the way the parties’ intention interacts with 
the law. More specifically, in uniform texts the relationship between the parties’ 
intention and legal provisions is formulated in a discrete, or even competitive 
way: the parties may (1) not express any intention, or express an intention in 
accordance with CISG/UPIC/PECL, in which case the latter apply (2) express a 
contrary intention, in which case that intention prevails. This setting is, again, 
perfect when the parties decide to insert a specific clause that either excludes the 
uniform text otherwise applicable, or regulates a specific aspect in a way 
different to that contemplated in that text. In both cases, if we do not apply the 
CISG/UPIC/PECL we still have a comprehensive solution in the domestic law 
applicable or in the clause carefully drafted by the parties. 
 
What these provisions do not resolve satisfactorily are the cases where the 
parties’ conduct and statements, even when not expressly saying so, are 
inconsistent with the pattern of behaviour envisaged in the uniform law 
 
23  Ibid. 
24  As a consequence of them, in cases where the CISG is deemed applicable (although the 
conclusion may be extended to the UPIC, or PECL) legal doctrines such as the parol evidence 
rule; which considers evidence not in writing irrelevant to determine the contents of the 
contract, are inapplicable. See Federal District Court of Illinois, 27 October 1998, Mitchell 
Aircraft Spares v. European Aircraft Service (Pace); and U.S. Federal Appellate Court 11th 
Circuit, 29 June 1998, MCC-Marble Ceramic Center v. Ceramica Nuova D’Agostino. 
25  The reference to the “nature and purpose” of the contract is absent from the Vienna Convention, 
but present in more modern texts, such as the UNIDROIT principles or the PECL. See article 
4.3 (d) UPIC, or article 5:102 (c) PECL. 
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provisions; and yet, since no express derogation or variation is made, no 
comprehensive alternative solution is provided, thereby making still necessary to 
resort to the uniform text again. In such cases the task of the judges/arbitrators is 
to look beyond the specific rules and beyond the specific statements, and 
understand the background of both the parties’ relationship and the law 
applicable. And it is for that task, i.e. for solving the interaction problems that we 
propose an approach based on a symbiotic, rather than competitive relationship 
between the law and the commercial context.  
  
In this regard, the solution should not limit itself to a properly acknowledge the 
parties’ intention, but should also include a purposive interpretation of the 
uniform law provisions. Fortunately, uniform law texts include the necessary 
tools, by providing that matters governed by the text, but not expressly settled 
therein, shall be resolved in accordance with the principles on which the text is 
based26. This view of the uniform text as a “system” constitutes the necessary 
supplement to the flexibility in appraising the parties’ intention. Thus, provisions 
on interpretation may help to address not only the “express gaps”, i.e. the issues 
covered but not resolved, but also “implicit gaps”, i.e. situations where the 
structure of the legal rules is unsuited to the parties’ intention, but they may not 
have set forth alternative rules, and the principles underlying the legal text may 
still be adequate. 
2.3. Commercial Context in Legal Education. The Experience of the Vis Moot 
Naturally, combining an adequate appraisal of the parties’ intention in non-
written form with a principles-based interpretation of the CISG/UPIC/PECL is 
easier said than done. Even if uniform law texts provide the legal tools, it is also 
necessary to have the “educational tools”, or the skills and background necessary 
to accomplish such a monumental task in a satisfactory way. 
 
It is in regard of this specific aspect that the work of Professor Bergsten has been 
path-breaking, and deserves our wholehearted praise, but also our scientific 
focus. In the competition he so successfully organizes, the Willem C Vis 
International Commercial Arbitration Moot27 he has expanded and promoted the 
study of the CISG (and also, more tangentially, of the UPIC or PECL) to levels 
unmatched by any other initiative. He has done so by drafting every year a 
 
26  Article 7 (2) CISG, article 1.6 (2) UPIC, article 1:106 (2) PECL. 
27  http://www.cisg.law.pace.edu/vis.html 
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different problem where a hypothetical situation modelled by practice constitutes 
the basis for the lively discussion and debate by the most promising young 
commercial lawyers, as well as well known experts in the field of international 
commercial contracts and arbitration that act as arbitrators. It would be 
impossible to analyse all the issues involved in the past seventeen editions. But a 
common element stands out; which connects with the subject matter of this work: 
the Vis, by formulating every problem in the context of a relationship between 
commercial parties shows the limitations of a purely legalistic approach. But 
every so often, it also shows the limitations of a competitive relationship between 
legal rules and parties’ intention, and the advantages of a symbiotic relationship, 
where the background of the parties’ relationship is combined with the principles 
of the Vienna Convention, or other uniform law texts. 
 
With the idea of contributing to the same goals of which Professor Bergsten’s 
Moot today constitutes the flagship, we have undertaken a parallel initiative, the 
Moot Madrid28. This competition, addressed at the Spanish-speaking community, 
has the same principle as Professor Bergsten’s, but has the idea of combining the 
CISG with other texts of uniform law; including but not restricted to the UPIC or 
PECL. In the following Sections we will illustrate our points with examples 
coming not just from the Vis Moot but also from the Moot Madrid.  
3. SPECIFIC ISSUES 
3.1. Formation of Contracts 
(a) Structure of Offer and Acceptance 
One example of the issue we want to discuss can be found in the structure of 
offer and acceptance. In the tenth edition of the Vis Moot the problem concerned 
two parties who had subscribed a first contract for the sale of polypropylene29, 
where the buyer was told that he would always receive the seller’s best price. 
This meant an 8% discount from the list price on the first transaction; which the 
buyer expected to repeat in the second order, only that he never said that to the 
seller, who had a 4% in mind. 
 
 
28  http://www.mootmadrid.es 
29  See http://www.cisg.law.pace.edu/cisg/moot/moot10.pdf 
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The issue that may come to mind, being this an issue about the price, is that of 
open price contracts; which, in the CISG context, connects with the apparent 
contradiction between its articles 14 (which requires a determined or 
determinable price for the offer to be valid) and 55 (which provides a way to set 
the price when the parties have left it deliberately open)30 . While several 
solutions have been proposed the one more widely accepted says that article 55 is 
applicable (among other situations) to cases where the parties intended to 
derogate from article 14, pursuant to article 631.  
 
Yet the moot problem went even further. Leaving aside cases where the parties 
have deliberately chosen to derogate from article 14 CISG, and to expressly leave 
the price open, there may be other cases where the parties may show assent to the 
existence of a contract, but may still have different ideas as to its contents.  
 
In this context, applying strictly the structure of offer and acceptance would lead 
to reject the existence of a contract, since the “mirror image” rule, by which an 
offer has been accepted in its entirety has not been complied with32. In the case of 
the I edition of the Moot Madrid a similar problem arose, but there the parties 
had begun making the arrangements for the performance of the contract33. Thus, 
the alternative solution would be to rely on such performance as an indication of 
acceptance, and to consider that the conditions stipulated by the party who sent 
the last communication (the “last shot”) prevails. However, this would construct 
as acceptance of the full set of conditions what in the given circumstances may 
 
30  Article 14 (1) CISG states:  
A proposal for concluding a contract addressed to one or more specific persons constitutes 
an offer if it is sufficiently definite and indicates the intention of the offeror to be bound in 
case of acceptance. A proposal is sufficiently definite if it indicates the goods and 
expressly or implicitly fixes or makes provision for determining the quantity and the price.  
Article 55 CISG, for its part, provides that:  
“Where a contract has been validly concluded but does not expressly or implicitly fix or 
make provision for determining the price, the parties are considered, in the absence of any 
indication to the contrary, to have impliedly made reference to the price generally charged 
at the time of the conclusion of the contract for such goods sold under comparable 
circumstances in the trade concerned. 
31 María del Pilar Perales Viscasillas, La Formacion del Contrato de Compraventa Internacional 
de Mercaderias (Valencia: Tirant lo Blanch, 1996), 353 et seq. 
32  María del Pilar Perales Viscasillas, ‘Battle of the Forms” Under the 1980 United Nations 
Convention on Contracts for the International Sale of Goods and the UNIDROIT Principles of 
International Commercial Contracts’, Pace International Law Review 10 (1998): 97-155. 
33  http://www.mootmadrid.es/moot2009/caso/Caso%20Moot%20Español-REV-2.pdf. 
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just have been an assent to be bound. Finally, we could take the alternative 
“knock-out doctrine” eliminate conflicting terms, and fill the gaps in accordance 
with the rest of the contract or the law applicable (be it the CISG, the UPIC, or 
PECL)34. 
 
All these possibilities can produce a decent and reasonable solution, but they fail 
to acknowledge the main issue captured in these cases; which is that the structure 
of offer and acceptance is but one way in which the parties can express consent 
to a contract. Even in cases where different communications are identifiable as an 
“offer”, an “acceptance” or a “counter-offer”, they may be used as a mere 
instrument to negotiate the specific terms of the contract; but not to express 
consent to the contract, provided that the parties have not conditioned such 
consent to the acceptance of some minimum terms. In that context, it could be 
overly simplistic to presume that consent has always to adjust to the offer-
acceptance structure, and that otherwise no contract can be concluded. 
 
An even clearer example of this issue was offered by Professor Schlechtriem in a 
workshop on the CISG35. In this example one firm, which has to manufacture a 
vessel for another firm, makes an invitation to several engine manufacturers to 
supply the diesel engines, including specifications, and approximate price and 
delivery dates. Once a manufacturer has expressed an interest, both CEOs sign a 
letter of intent committing themselves to supply two teams to negotiate the 
details: a technical team, to negotiate aspects such as the engine’s power, weight, 
inspection periods, etc; and a financial team, to negotiate delivery dates, terms of 
payment, letters of credit and guarantees, etc. The negotiating procedure is the 
same in both cases: as the teams reach an agreement on a particular point, they 
record it in a document. The terms negotiated by the technical and financial 
teams were each merged into its own memorandum of understanding, signed by 
all negotiators, and the two memoranda should be merged into a single document 
to be signed by both CEOs in a ceremony with champagne. Before the signing 
ceremony the purchaser is informed that the cruise company for which it was 
 
34  However, there are strong arguments against the applicability of the “knock-out doctrine” in the 
context of the CISG. See Perales Viscasillas, supra note 32. The UPIC and PECL, on the other 
hand, warmly embrace this idea. See article 2.1.22 of UPIC, and article 2:209 (1) of PECL. 
35 Harry Flechtner (ed.), ‘Transcript of a Workshop on the Sales Convention: Leading CISG 
Scholars discuss Contract Formation, Validity, Excuse for Hardship, Avoidance Nachfrist, 
Contract Interpretation, Parol Evidence, Analogical Application and much more, Journal of Law 
and Commerce 18 (1999): 221-222. Available at 
http://www.cisg.law.pace.edu/cisg/biblio/workshop.html. 
P. Perales Viscasillas & D. Ramos Muñoz: From Competition to Symbiosis 
785 
going to manufacture the vessel has filed for bankruptcy; and it cancels the 
signature36.  
 
The case shows that the two parties consciously departed from the behavioural 
pattern of offer and acceptance envisaged in the law. In that context, to argue that 
there was not an accepted offer, and thereby the seller has no contractual rights 
would probably be unjust. But to strictly apply a provision such as article 6 CISG 
would still be insufficient, since the parties may have “derogated” the legal 
provisions, but they have not stipulated an alternative mechanism to regulate the 
existence of contractual consent. Thus, a competitive relationship between 
parties’ will and the uniform law provisions would imply a circular argument: the 
parties have, by their conduct, excluded the CISG, but they have not stipulated 
alternative rules; and thus the issue cannot be resolved with reference to the 
CISG because the parties have excluded it.  
 
Therefore, the most sensible solution would be to look beyond specific 
provisions, and make a purposive, principles-based interpretation of the CISG, 
pursuant to its article 7 (2). It could be argued, for example, that those principles, 
for a contract to be formed; require, first, the presence of sufficient consent to be 
obliged; and, second, contract contents that are determined, or can be determined 
by reference to the parties’ context.  
 
More modern uniform law texts, such as the UPIC, make room for this approach 
within the provisions on contract formation, by accepting that a contract may be 
concluded by the acceptance of an offer, but also by conduct of the parties that is 
sufficient to show agreement 37 . Even more precisely, the PECL omits the 
reference to the offer and acceptance, by merely requiring (a) intention to be 
legally bound, and (b) a sufficient agreement38. However, the difficult cases may 
not always find a specifically tailored solution in the law. We believe we have 
offered an alternative way to reach the same result by resorting to a principles-
based interpretation. 
(b) Revocation of Offers 
Another point in the field of contract formation where the relevance of the 
relationship between commercial context and commercial law is very present is 
 
36  Ibid., 221-222. 
37  Article 2.1.1. UPIC. 
38  Article 2:101 PECL. 
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the issue of the revocability of the offer; which was raised in the problem of the 
fifteenth edition of the Vis Moot39. That problem involved the negotiations for 
the sale of cases of wine that were going to be leading the wine promotion by the 
purchaser; which was a supermarket chain. 
 
In the case the prospective purchaser made an offer indicating a maximum period 
of time within which it had to be accepted. Shortly before that date the press in 
the country of the seller (slightly echoed in the country of the buyer) uncovered 
some cases where domestic wine manufacturers had been using ethylene glycol, 
an anti-freezer, to sweeten the wine, turning it into a safety scandal. The issue 
threatened to break-up in the country of the buyer as well; and, weighing the 
possible consequences (negative publicity, plunge in sales, putting the whole 
campaign in jeopardy…) the purchaser decided to cancel the offer. 
 
Immediately at stake in this case was the debate on the revocability of an offer, 
the diverging approaches in the US (revocability as a general rule) and civil law 
systems (irrevocability as a general rule), or the elements that may render the 
offer irrevocable40. But we believe that there were further, deeper issues that 
connect with our subject matter of analysis. That case showed the shortcomings 
of the limited choice between a revocable and an irrevocable offer in a complex 
context where commercial reality played a paramount importance. In this regard, 
from a purely legalistic perspective, the main argument of the purchaser may lie 
in the language employed in making the offer, to suggest that it was a lapsing 
offer, rather than an irrevocable offer. But, from the perspective of commercial 
reality and common sense, the main argument was that, even if the language 
pointed towards the irrevocability of the offer, the whole order was made in the 
understanding that the wine purchase would help the marketing of the promotion, 
not put the whole thing in jeopardy.  
 
In the case the factual premises of this point were also moot (whether both parties 
had the same understanding, whether the seller had to bear the risk…) but the 
main difficulty was in how to reconcile this common-sense argument with the 
 
39  http://www.cisg.law.pace.edu/cisg/moot/moot15.pdf 
40  John O. Honnold, Uniform Law for International Sales under the 1980 United Nations 
Convention 3rd ed. (The Hague: Kluwer Law International, 1999) § 140, p. 159 et seq.; Henry 
Mather, ‘Firm Offers under the UCC and the CISG’, Dickinson Law Review 105 (Fall 2000): 41 
et seq.; Shahdeen Malik, ‘Offer: Revocable or Irrevocable. Will Art. 16 of the Convention on 
Contracts for the International Sale Ensure Uniformity?’, Indian Journal of International Law 
25 (1985): 26-49; and Perales Viscasillas, supra note 31, 410 et seq. 
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structure of CISG provisions. According to CISG, offers are either revocable or 
irrevocable. Yet hypothetically the parties could draft a clause in a master 
agreement for their future negotiations, stipulating that, even if an offer is 
irrevocable, it may still be revoked in exceptional circumstances of substantial 
detriment for the offeree41. And, pursuant to the anti-formalistic principle of 
uniform law, the parties could, instead of drafting the clause, behave as if such 
clause existed42.  
 
The trouble, again, is that, in such case, there would be no express language to 
regulate such “exceptional revocation” causes. But this does not mean that the 
solution is to discard the argument altogether, and turn again to the legal 
provisions, applying them strictly. Rather, we suggest that the proper way would 
be to accept that the parties’ behaviour indicates an acceptance of the principle 
underlying the revocable/irrevocable distinction, i.e. that certain assurances made 
by one party to another, create a state of mind in the recipient (which may act in 
reliance to them) that is susceptible to create contractual rights, despite no 
contract has been concluded. But it is possible that the parties accept that 
underlying principle; and yet do not accept the strict division between revocable 
and irrevocable offers. In case of a positive conclusion, the gap would be in 
establishing the “exceptional” or “specific” revocation causes. But, again, a 
principles-based interpretation of the uniform law texts can provide with a 
reasonable solution by resorting to the causes that permit a party to avoid the 
contract, especially the fundamental breach of that contract by the other party. 
3.2. Conformity of Goods and Communication of Defects 
(a) Conformity of Goods, and the Circumstances in the Buyer’s and Seller’s 
Country 
On conformity of the goods the approach of the CISG relies on a double test. 
First, the goods must be in conformity with what the parties have agreed in the 
contract (article 35 (1) CISG)43. Second, in the absence of such agreement, the 
goods are not conforming to the contract unless they are (a) fit for their ordinary 
use, and (b) fit for any particular purpose made known to the seller at the time of 
 
41  Article 6 CISG, and article 1.5 UPIC and article 1:102 PECL would make it possible. 
42  See article 11 CISG, article 1.2 UPIC, and article 2:101 PECL. 
43  The actual reference of article 35 (1) CISG is to the “quantity, quality and description required 
by the contract”, and to the packaging required in the contract. 
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the conclusion of the contract44 (and are packaged in the manner usual or 
adequate to preserve such goods; and, in case a sample was given, conform to the 
sample)45.  
 
CISG provisions thus cover the issue of conformity from a broad range of 
perspectives. The trouble, however, of a provision that focuses on “quantity, 
quality and description” on one side, and on “ordinary and particular use” on 
another is that it leaves unaddressed the issue of compliance with regulatory 
standards. This issue has been the subject of much analysis and it is not our 
purpose to reproduce the arguments here46. It is enough to say that the major 
breakthrough on the issue came with a case decided by the German Supreme 
Court (BGH) on 1995, on a sale of New Zealand mussels by a Swiss seller to a 
German buyer (also known as the mussels case). The mussels had a slight 
contamination with cadmium47. The levels of cadmium of the mussels were 
permitted under the seller’s country safety regulations, but not under the rules of 
the country of the buyer.  
 
The court had to decide whether the goods were conforming. It decided in the 
affirmative, holding that the seller does not need to know the contents of safety 
 
44  Article 35 (2) (a) and (b) CISG. 
45  Article 35 (2) (c) and (d) CISG. 
46  See Harry M. Flechtner, ‘Funky Mussels, a Stolen Car, and Decrepit Used Shoes: Non-
Conforming Goods and Notice thereof under the United Nations Sales Convention (“CISG”)’ 
Boston University International Law Journal (Spring 2008): 4-11; Clayton P Gillette & Franco 
Ferrari, ‘Warranties and “Lemons” under CISG Article 35(2)(a)’, Internationales Handesrecht 
(1/2010): 2-17; René Franz Henschel, ‘Conformity of Goods in International Sales Governed 
by CISG Article 35: Caveat Venditor, Caveat Emptor and Contract Law as Background Law 
and as a Competing Set of Rules’, Nordic Journal of Commercial Law (2004/1) available at 
http://www.cisg.law.pace.edu/cisg/biblio/henschel2.html; Peter Schlechtriem, ‘Compliance with 
local law; seller’s obligations and liability – Annotation to German Supreme Court decision of 2 
March 2005 [VIII ZR 67/04]’, available at  
http://www.cisg.law.pace.edu/cisg/biblio/schlechtriem7.html, and ‘Uniform Sales Law in the 
Decisions of the Bundesgerichtshof’ (translation by Todd J. Fox), in 50 Years of 
the Bundesgerichtshof [Federal Supreme Court of Germany] Celebration Anthology from the 
Academic Community available at  
http://www.cisg.law.pace.edu/cisg/biblio/schlechtriem3.html#iv. See also the case by the 
German Supreme Court of 8 March 1995 (New Zealand mussels case), available at 
http://www.cisg.law.pace.edu/cisg/wais/db/cases2/950308g3.html, or the case by the 
Netherlands Arbitration Institute (Condensate crude oil mix case), available at 
http://cisgw3.law.pace.edu/cases/021015n1.html.  
47  See the case by the German Supreme Court of 8 March 1995 (the New Zealand mussels case), 
available at http://www.cisg.law.pace.edu/cisg/wais/db/cases2/950308g3.html.  
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regulations of the buyer’s country, unless (1) the same rules also exist in the 
seller’s country; (2) the buyer draws the seller’s attention to their existence; (3) 
or the seller should know of those rules due to “special circumstances”. Those 
“special circumstances” include, for example (i) when the seller has a branch in 
the buyer’s country, (ii) when the parties are in a longstanding business 
relationship, (iii) when the seller regularly exports in the buyer’s country, or (iv) 
when the seller advertises its own products in the buyer’s country. 
 
Uniform law rules provide for “context” in their appraisal of conformity; they 
simply did not do so for the issue of safety regulations. This, plus their broad 
language allowed the court to make a purposive interpretation without 
acknowledging the existence of a gap and resorting to article 7 (2) CISG.  
 
And yet the decision by the German Supreme Court left issues unanswered, 
issues that heavily depend on the commercial context. Two of them are (1) the 
issue of changing regulations; and (2) the relationship between regulation, public 
awareness, and conformity. Each and every of them were dealt with in another 
case by the German Supreme Court48, and in two separate Vis Moot problems, 
for the fifteenth edition49, and for the seventeenth edition50. 
 
The German case concerned a sale of pork meat from a Belgian wholesaler to a 
German merchant; who resold the meat to another German trader, who resold it 
to a final purchaser in Bosnia-Herzegovina. The meat would be directly delivered 
in three instalments to the second German trader, who would re-dispatch it to 
Bosnia. Each delivery was to be accompanied by a certificate of suitability to 
consumption. After the contract was concluded a suspicion arose in both 
Germany and Belgium that Belgian meat could contain dioxin. This translated 
into new rules passed during the period when the goods were being delivered 
(June), i.e. after the conclusion of the contract but before delivery, in Germany, 
the EU and Bosnia51, resulting on the seizure and destruction of the meat; 
 
48  Bundesgerichtshof (German Supreme Court) decision of 2 March 2005 [VIII ZR 67/04]. See 
also the commentary by Professor Peter Schlechtriem. Peter Schlechtriem, ‘Compliance with 
local law; seller’s obligations and liability’, supra note 46. 
49  http://www.cisg.law.pace.edu/cisg/moot/moot15.pdf 
50  http://www.cisg.law.pace.edu/cisg/moot/moot17.pdf 
51  The bottom line of those rules is that meat produced in Belgium during a “suspicion” period was 
not of merchantable quality unless it was accompanied by administrative certificates indicating 
otherwise.  
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whereas Belgium did not pass a similar regulation until July, when the goods had 
been delivered.  
 
As said, this case illustrates two different points of contact between commercial 
context and commercial law. Take, first, the issue of changing regulations. This 
issue, addressed in the BGH case, was expanded in the problem for the 
seventeenth edition of the Vis Moot52. In that problem there was a sale of steel 
pumps that would be employed in an irrigation project in a third country. The 
contract had a clause stipulating that goods are confirming with regulations for 
importation in the buyer’s country, and for use in the third country53. After a 
period of social unrest there was a coup d’état in the third country; and a 
subsequent legislative modification of safety regulations, prohibiting the use of 
beryllium in steel alloys. As a result, the authorities cancelled the project, and the 
buyer tried to avoid the contract. 
 
This is a case where one of the exceptions to the rule that the seller is only 
concerned with its own country’s rules; i.e. a clause was included in the contract. 
The question is what is the reach of that exception, particularly in a case where 
regulations change dramatically (and, one could argue, unexpectedly). A rules-
based solution would focus on the issue either approaching conformity as a 
contract matter; thereby focusing on the moment the contract is concluded; or as 
a matter of risk, thereby focusing on the rules on risk transfer (which focus on 
delivery). Both approaches would leave out the commercial context in which the 
issue arose.  
 
On the other hand, a solution based exclusively on the parties intention would 
draw upon the language of the clause, to decide what the parties meant when they 
said that the “the goods are conforming with regulations for use in the third 
country”: were they referring to the moment the contract was concluded, or were 
they projecting the seller’s risk assumption into the future? However, there is a 
limit to what the parties had in mind when they concluded the contract 
(particularly in light of the fact that further events were unforeseeable); and 
overstretching the interpretation of their intention can create an artificial solution.  
 
As such, it seems more adequate to conclude that the parties’ intention clearly 
indicated that regulations other than the seller’s country’s were relevant for the 
 
52  See http://www.cisg.law.pace.edu/cisg/moot/moot17.pdf. 
53  Ibid. p. 12. 
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issue of conformity; and that they clearly expressed the purpose of the sale. 
Beyond that, the solution should involve a combination of the interpretation of 
that intention with the uniform law principles underlying conformity, risk 
transfer54, incorporation by reference55 all in accordance with the cornerstone 
principle of good faith. 
 
As to the second issue (the influence of public awareness on conformity, and its 
combination with regulation) the BGH decided that, in the dioxin case, safety 
regulations did not per se determine the conformity of the goods, but constituted 
a symptom of the actual benchmark for conformity, which was public awareness. 
Goods produced under certain circumstances were widely considered unfit; and 
that rendered them unfit. Further regulations only confirmed that, but the non-
conformity was already present56.  
 
The influence of mere “suspicions” or “awareness” in conformity was expanded 
in the problem of the fifteenth edition of the Vis Moot57. There the goods to be 
sold were cases of wine that would be employed in a wine promotion by a 
supermarket chain. A scandal erupts in the buyer’s country’s newspapers, 
concerning the use by some producers in the seller’s country of ethylene glycol, 
an anti-freezer to sweeten the wine. This prompts the buyer to cancel the order58, 
despite the fact that the seller only employed “dyethylene glycol”, a substance 
permitted under the laws of both the seller’s and the buyer’s country, on the basis 
that it was unfit to lead a wine promotion, and it would hinder the overall sales. 
In this case the goods complied with safety regulations. It was a matter of public 
awareness, and its influence in the conformity of the goods. In the German case 
safety regulations constituted a proof of non-conformity, not a benchmark, but, 
still, it was a strong proof. The question is what happens when public awareness 
is present, but may be unfounded (at least in the particular case) and not 
accompanied by public regulations.  
 
 
54  For example, (1) in the absence of a clear-cut risk transfer clause, should risk transfer rules be 
applied mechanically? Does the notion of “risk” for risk transfer purposes include regulatory 
risk? Should then the rules on unforeseeability and insurmountability of article 79 CISG apply? 
55  To what extent should the seller’s fortunes be subordinated to the fortunes of the buyer-third 
party contract and its terms? 
56 Peter Schlechtriem, ‘Compliance with local law; seller’s obligations and liability’, supra note 46 
at § II. 
57  http://www.cisg.law.pace.edu/cisg/moot/moot15.pdf. 
58  In this case the contract had not been concluded; and the problem also involved whether the 
buyer’s offer was revocable or not. This has been covered in a previous section. Supra 3.1.(b). 
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This shows that the CISG provisions on conformity have a focus on the 
characteristics of the goods; so the question of how to account for external 
factors, in particular the perception of the goods does not logically follow from 
the letter of those provisions. It is a different situation where the commercial 
context overrides some of the law’s underlying assumptions, but does not give all 
the answers, which makes it necessary to resort to a symbiotic approach, with a 
principles-based interpretation. Indeed, the combination of this issue with the 
divergence of conditions between the seller’s and the buyer’s country creates a 
gap within a gap (i.e. how to account for the influence of external perceptions in 
the conformity of the goods, when the provisions are more focused on an 
objective analysis of the goods’ characteristics; in a case where the conditions in 
the buyer and the seller’s country differ, provided the law talks about a single 
“ordinary use”, and a single “particular purpose”). Still, the flexibility of the 
provisions on conformity may allow for a purposive, principles-based 
interpretation without acknowledging expressly the existence of a gap. It is only 
required that the person operating with the CISG provisions is aware of the 
problem. 
 
A final point in this regard that was addressed in the problem of the II edition of 
the Moot Madrid59 situates the matter of conformity and regulations in a broader 
context; approaching it even closer to the issue subject-matter of our analysis 
here. In that case the goods were a machine to process PVC, aluminium and 
steel. The lessee (for the problem did concern a lease, not a sale) referred to a 
model of machinery, inquiring that it wanted it, among other things, to 
manufacture parts for the automotive industry, citing some of its clients (auto 
manufacturers). The supplier responded that the machine suited that purpose, and 
the machine was delivered. The trouble is that, when processing some hard steel 
(for pistons) the machine overheated and had to be reset. Upon examination it 
was discovered that the machine was inadequate to process steel beyond a certain 
level of hardness; which was the one necessary for the lessee to manufacture 
some parts. According to some administrative guidelines within the supplier’s 
country, however, steel beyond a certain level of hardness was considered “steel 
for tools”, so the supplier said it could not realize the parts “for the automotive 
industry” could have those characteristics. 
 
 
59 http://www.mootmadrid.es/caso/Caso%20Moot%20Madrid%202010%20con%20aclaraciones. 
pdf 
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The several problems illustrated here constitute but different angles of a single 
problem, concerning an underlying assumption of the law. Since the law is 
uniform, it presumes that the commercial context is also uniform, hence the 
single-minded reference to “quality”, “description”, “ordinary use” or “particular 
use”, presuming that those elements mean the same for both parties. This is the 
correct approach, since one of the goals of the law is to promote uniformity (i.e. 
the law not as an acknowledgement of reality, but as an instrument of change). 
But then the rules based on such an approach have to deal with cases where that 
underlying assumption is not true; as when safety requirements are different in 
the buyer’s and seller’s country, when public awareness is different and also 
changes over time; or when commercial standards vary not only locally, but also 
between the local and global context (in the case of the second edition of Moot 
Madrid the guidelines on the use of steel in the seller’s country were different to 
the practice of global car manufacturers). In every case commercial reality 
provides a lot of input. But it is necessary to take the uniform law principles as 
parameters to organize that input, and define which is the commercial context 
relevant to resolve the dispute. 
 
These are aspects that are not covered by uniform law texts; and where the 
commercial context is inconsistent with the uniform rules. Ignoring the problem 
will not make it disappear. Ignoring the rules would make the solution 
unpredictable and incomplete, since the commercial context does not supply the 
tools to solve the problems. As earlier, the proper solution is to acknowledge the 
need for a symbiotic relationship between commercial reality and (uniform) 
commercial law. 
(b) Communication of Defects 
Regarding the issue of conformity, we must also examine what may be the single 
most litigated provision (after the one on damages) of the CISG: its article 39, 
which establishes the duty of the buyer to notify the seller specifying any lack of 
conformity that the goods may have within a reasonable time after they have 
been inspected60. In case no notice is made, the buyer is prevented from 
exercising any remedy. 
 
60  Article 39 (1) CISG states that: 
The buyer loses the right to rely on a lack of conformity of the goods if he does not give 
notice to the seller specifying the nature of the lack of conformity within a reasonable 
time after he has discovered it or ought to have discovered it. 
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This provision was the subject matter of analysis in the problem of the ninth 
edition of the Vis Moot61. In that case there was a sale of machinery. Among 
other issues the seller of the machinery was running into financial difficulties by 
the time the installation had to be made. This required the presence of several of 
the seller’s employees in the buyer’s premises. The seller’s financial difficulties 
did not allow it to send its full team, so there were less people, and stayed for a 
shorter period. In addition (according to the plaintiff’s version) they were quite 
absent-minded during their stay in the premises (probably more worried about 
their own jobs than about properly training the buyer’s employees). The lack of 
professionalism was serious enough for the buyer’s employees to raise the issue 
with the seller’s employees while they were there, but to no avail. After they left, 
the machinery could not perform at full capacity, but the seller had entered 
insolvency proceedings. It was not until several months later that the buyer 
notified the bank the seller had assigned the receivables from the sale that it 
intended to seek a reduction in the price. 
 
The immediate issues involved whether several months qualified as a “reasonable 
period of time” in the light of the circumstances62 (assignment, insolvency of the 
seller…) whether the notice was sufficiently specific63; whether, pursuant to 
article 44 CISG, there was a reasonable excuse for the delay64, etc. But an issue 
 
61  http://www.cisg.law.pace.edu/cisg/moot/moot9.pdf 
62  This has been an issue hotly debated among scholars and case law; which have discussed 
whether a consensus can be reached on a specific period, even to be taken as a basis to be later 
adjusted. The CISG Advisory Council Opinion, after examining a vast array of case law and 
scholarly writings, seems to have settled the issue, holding that “reasonable” periods can widely 
vary depending on the circumstances; and thus, the solution of the CISG is not to attempt at 
establishing a single period. See CISG-AC Opinion no 2, Examination of the Goods and Notice 
of Non-Conformity: Articles 38 and 39, 7 June 2004. Rapporteur: Professor Eric E. Bergsten, 
Emeritus, Pace University School of Law, New York, available at 
http://www.cisg.law.pace.edu/cisg/CISG-AC-op2.html#14, Art. 39 no. 3. 
63  The more authoritative opinion of courts seems to be that in sales of complex machinery the 
buyer can be expected to give notice of the symptoms, but not to specify their causes. See the 
decision by the German Supreme Court BGH, 3 November 1999, VIII ZR 287/98, [2000] RIW 
381, case presentation and English translation http://cisgw3.law.pace.edu/cases/991103g1.html. 
See also CISG-AC Opinion no 2, Examination of the Goods and Notice of Non-Conformity: 
Articles 38 and 39 para. 5.14. 
64  Article 44 CISG states that:  
Notwithstanding the provisions of paragraph (1) of article 39 and paragraph (1) of article 
43, the buyer may reduce the price in accordance with article 50 or claim damages, except 
for loss of profit, if he has a reasonable excuse for his failure to give the required notice.  
It has been questioned whether article 44 CISG adds anything to the mechanism of article 39, 
which already provides with tools to grant sufficient flexibility in taking account of the specific 
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that, expectedly or not, was the subject of heated debate was whether the notice 
was necessary at all, given that the seller knew or could not have been unaware 
of the non-conformity, pursuant to article 40 CISG, in the light of its reckless 
handling of the installation and training period. 
 
The relationship between articles 39 and 40 CISG has been the subject of 
analysis by one of us in an essay; in an attempt to make a specific illustration of 
the need for a symbiotic approach in addressing the context/law relationship65. 
Article 39 CISG provides for the duty of the buyer to notify the defects to the 
seller; article 40CISG provides that the seller may not rely on such lack of notice 
when it knew or could not have been unaware of those defects. And here comes 
the important thing. Depending on the moment until which article 40 operates, its 
actual role may vary drastically. If we choose the more conservative position, the 
“knowledge” referred to under article 40 must be established before the goods are 
handed over to the buyer66. In that case, the message sent by the law is that the 
seller cannot rely on the absence of a notice in cases where it wilfully concealed, 
or recklessly disregarded the defects before the buyer took possession of the 
goods. It plays as an ultimate safeguard to against misbehaviour.  
 
On the other hand, we can consider that article 40 operates as an exception to 
article 39; and, therefore, the “knowledge” can be acquired until the very moment 
when the “reasonable time” set forth in article 39 expires67. In that case, article 40 
has the potential to become something very different. In that case, both 
provisions, articles 39 and 40, constitute two different sides, or approaches, to a 
single problem.  
 
The problem is, clearly, the need for certainty on the side of the seller; who 
cannot be left indefinitely with a potential problem hanging around its neck, 
because the buyer has not been quick enough to notify. That could prove 
disastrous in the context of commercial sales. But then, there are two ways to 
tackle that problem. Article 39 relies on the “notice” requirement; and so the 
                                                                                     
circumstances. See CISG-AC Opinion no 2, Examination of the Goods and Notice of Non-
Conformity: Articles 38 and 39 para. 4.3. 
65  David Ramos Muñoz, ‘The Rules on Communication of Defects in the CISG: Static Rules and 
Dynamic Environments. Different Scenarios for a Single Player’, Pace essay December 2005. 
Available at http://www.cisg.law.pace.edu/cisg/biblio/munoz.html. 
66 Frizt Enderlein, Dietrich Maskow, International Sales Law. See also Landgericht Landshut 
(Germany) 5 April 1995.  
67  Ingebor Schwenzer, in Peter Schlechtriem, Commentary on the United Nations Convention on 
Contracts for the International Sale of Goods 2nd ed. (Oxford University Press: 2002), Article 
40 para. 8; Ramos Muñoz, supra note 65, note 293 and accompanying text. 
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analysis on the court must be exclusively on the side of the buyer (whether the 
buyer notified timely, to the right person, whether it properly specified the 
defects, etc.) Article 40 CISG relies on “knowledge”; which, one can see, 
involves an approach that is more vague but also more flexible. For knowledge 
can be gained by means of a notice, but also by other means; including, for 
example, a “not proper” notice. This permits an overall assessment of the buyer’s 
and seller’s side, one that weighs the parties’ diligence68. 
 
Then we must answer to what extent this is relevant to the present work. It is in 
the sense that CISG rules on communication of defects presume a pattern of 
behaviour: (1) the goods are handed over (2) they are examined shortly (3) 
defects are detected (4) a notice is given to the seller. This suits many 
transactions, particularly spot transactions, where parties are “faceless” and 
interchangeable, they do not have to work together, and there is no relationship at 
all. But if there is some interaction between buyer and seller the whole structure 
wobbles. Because the parties may behave in a way that is inconsistent with the 
need for a notice, or even with the whole handing over-examination-notice 
pattern.  
 
In such cases the solution must be a specific application of the symbiotic 
relationship between the commercial context and uniform commercial law that 
we defend here. First, we can take the more flexible view of article 40, and 
directly make an overall assessment of the parties’ diligence, weighing the needs 
for certainty and good faith. Second, if article 40 were held to its more restricted 
application, we still cannot ignore that the circumstances, and the parties’ 
behaviour may be inconsistent with the notice requirement. In such cases, the gap 
left by the notice requirement must be filled with a principled interpretation of 
the CISG provisions; which, again, would mean a contrast between the need that 
the seller is duly protected against unreasonable requests, and the need not to 
forget that it was the seller who delivered non-conforming goods, and the buyer 
needs to be protected too. The solution would be very close to the one achieved 
under the first possibility; only the threshold to resort to it would be higher (the 
buyer would need to prove that the parties’ context was inconsistent with the 
need of notice). 
 
68 Ramos Muñoz, supra note 65. 
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3.3. Remedies for Breach of Contract 
(a) Specific Performance 
The issue of specific performance was the subject of debate in the problem of the 
first edition of the Moot Madrid69. In that case there was a sale of digital TVs at a 
time where the buyer’s country was about to experience the switch to digital 
technology, and the analogical blackout. In that sense, the immediate issue was 
whether requesting the specific performance of the seller’s obligation was 
justified or not. The buyer would argue that the path-breaking technology of the 
TVs would provide the buyer with a significant advantage over rivals, allowing it 
to enjoy some of the “monopoly” benefits similar to the ones enjoyed by the 
distributor of a patented invention (say, a new drug). The seller would argue that 
the market provided plenty of substitute goods; at stake would be whether the 
CISG limits specific performance depending on the availability of replacements, 
as the UPIC, or PECL do70. 
 
But beyond that, as the underlying issue, is the issue of whether and to what 
extent the law should acknowledge the changing nature of the contract. In the 
problem, the frictions between the parties began when the buyer was threatened 
with legal action by a competitor in case it attempted to distribute the TVs. The 
TVs, argued the competitor, had hardware (the TV stand) and software elements 
that infringed intellectual property rights of the competitor and a software 
manufacturer. As a result of such threats, the buyer asked the seller to make 
adjustments accordingly. The seller, after trying to talk the buyer out of that 
request, resigns itself to do it, but in exchange for payment. The buyer 
emphasizes that, obviously, it assumed the seller should do the changes at its own 
expense, for it was its fault. 
 
If we look into the structure of the CISG and other uniform law texts, we see that 
specific performance is, naturally, under the heading on “remedies”: there has 
been a breach, and the aggrieved party is entitled to request performance71. 
Contract modification, on the other hand, requires mutual consent72. In principle, 
the distinction is clear-cut in the rules. However, these rules do not acknowledge 
 
69  http://www.mootmadrid.es/moot2009/caso/Caso%20Moot%20Español-REV-2.pdf. 
70  Article 7.2.2. (c) UPIC, article 9:102 (d) PECL. 
71  See article 46 CISG, articles 7.2.1. and 7.2.2. UPIC, and articles 9:101 and 9:102 PECL. 
72  See article 29 (1) CISG, articles 2.1.1 and 2.1.18 UPIC, articles 2:101 (1) and 2:106 PECL.  
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the changing nature of a contractual relationship. In this regard, remedies 
themselves are instruments of change: when a non-conformity in the goods or 
delay in performance occurs, that changes the contract forever. In each case, the 
performance in practice will not adjust to the one originally envisaged by the 
parties: it will involve different goods, or goods + repair, or a different delivery 
time, plus an adjustment in damages. In cases where no party is responsible for 
the change in circumstances, the parties will have to agree to a modification. But 
in any event the sharp distinction between requests of performance and contract 
modification may differ in practice from the way the parties see their 
relationship. Sometimes the existence of a breach may not be in their minds when 
negotiating the solution. Sometimes curing a breach within their contract may 
involve acts that go beyond that contract (i.e. settling an issue with a third party). 
Again, the commercial context may be inconsistent with legal categories. 
 
In this regard, the notion of “breach” to allocate the costs of modification may be 
insufficient; as well as specific performance rules that provide when specific 
performance can be requested, without focusing on what can be requested as 
“specific performance” (as if that notion were entirely clear). The classification 
of some acts of repair or adjustment as acts of “performance” of the original 
obligation; or acts in “modification” of that obligation can be random, or 
otherwise depend on very subtle nuances. The alternative could be in an 
interpretation that properly accounts for the commercial context, and goes 
beyond the rules and focuses on the principles. In this context, the principle of 
“reasonableness” could play a significant role, together with the provisions that 
establish the “breach” of contract, to decide in each case what can be requested, 
and who should bear the burden. 
(b) Damages 
An issue that clearly illustrates the difficult relationship between commercial 
context and uniform commercial law was present in the problem of the tenth 
edition of the Vis Moot. In that case, as a result of the buyer’s cancelling of the 
contract the seller claimed the profit margin it would have made in that 
transaction73.  
 
 
73  http://www.cisg.law.pace.edu/cisg/moot/moot10.pdf. 
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In this case the problem was more on the surface than in other cases. It is the case 
of damages for “loss of volume” of sales74; where, as in the problem described 
above, after the buyer has repudiated the contract (which constitutes a 
fundamental breach giving rise to the other party’s right to avoid) the plaintiff-
seller requests the profit margin he would have made in the transaction. The 
trouble with that request is that it seems inconsistent with the behaviour 
envisaged in CISG provisions on damages75. Article 75 CISG provides that, when 
the contract has been avoided, the aggrieved party may claim the difference 
between the contract price and the price in the substitute transaction76. In cases 
where the contract has been avoided but no substitute transaction has been 
effected, article 76 stipulates that damages may be equal to the difference 
between the contract price and the current price at the time of avoidance77. Those 
two provisions clearly indicate that, in cases of avoidance, the loss must be 
calculated by reference to a substitute transaction, either real (article 75), or 
hypothetical (article 76).  
 
The problem with these provisions is that they presume the existence of a 
substitute transaction; i.e. the behaviour envisaged in the law is that of a party 
who goes to the market and buys/sells substitute goods. But then, the question is 
what happens when not the parties’ conduct, but the commercial context, is 
inconsistent with that assumption. In the ‘lost volume’ hypothesis the situation is 
that of a seller who has spare capacity, i.e. it can perform with the repudiating 
party, and also, at least, with another party. Typically, if A was going to sell 1000 
goods to B, but B repudiates and A ends selling them to C, the A-C transaction is 
not a substitute to A-B; it is an additional transaction to A-B. A could have 
supplied both B and C. Therefore, when B repudiates what A loses is the profit 
margin it would have made in that sale. 
 
 
74 David Ramos Muñoz, ‘La perdida de volumen de Ventas como Daño Indemnizable’, CEF Legal 
Revista Práctica de Derecho 74 (marzo 2007): 60-68. 
75  Particularly the duty to mitigate. As an early analysis of the issues arising from the apparent 
contradiction between mitigation and loss volume (in the context of American law), see Robert J 
Harris, ‘A General Theory for Measuring Damages for Total Breach of Contract’, Michigan 
Law Review 60 (1962): 600-601. In the CISG context, see David Ramos Muñoz, supra note 74, 
95-99; and Djakhongir Saidov, ‘Methods of Limiting Damages under the Vienna Convention on 
Contracts for the International Sale of Goods’, available at  
http://www.cisg.law.pace.edu/cisg/biblio/saidov.html. 
76  See also section § 2-706 of the US Uniform Commercial Code. 
77  See also section § 2-708 (1) of the US Uniform Commercial Code. 
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Yet the trouble, again, lies in reconciling this commercial reality with the 
provisions of uniform commercial law; particularly articles 75 and 76 CISG. The 
solutions range from the more specific to the more general. On the “specific” 
side, one possibility is to rely on the language of those provisions, which states 
that the aggrieved party can recover the difference contract price – substitute 
transaction price/current price, as well as any further damages78, and argue that 
the lost volume damages are such “additional damages” 79 . However, we 
respectfully disagree with that, for lost volume damages are not “additional 
damages” in the case of a substitute transaction: they are contrary to the very 
existence of a substitute transaction, which constitutes the premise to apply the 
CISG specific damages provisions.  
 
On the other end of the spectrum would be the default solution that we have 
articulated in this work: to argue that, in the case at hand, the commercial context 
(not even the parties’ conduct) is inconsistent with the law provisions; which 
makes it necessary a principles-based interpretation of the uniform law, to fill in 
the gap. In this case such an interpretation would be based in the core principle of 
damages: full compensation; which indicates that every loss complying with the 
legal limits (causation, certainty, or foreseeability) must be compensated80.  
 
In this case, however, we do not believe that the whole solution would need to 
proceed on the assumption that specific damages provisions have been wiped out. 
Rather, we believe that the very language of damage provisions for the case of 
avoidance (articles 75 and 76 CISG) is optional. Article 75 CISG states that if the 
contract has been avoided, and if the aggrieved party has made a substitute 
transaction, that party may recover the difference contract price-substitute price. 
Article 76 CISG states that if no substitute transaction has been effected, the 
aggrieved party may recover the difference contract price-current price. But we 
 
78  Article 75 and 76 (1) CISG. 
79  In this sense, see Harry M. Flechtner, ‘Remedies Under the New International Sales 
Convention: The Perspectives from Article 2 of the UCC’, Journal of Law and Commerce 8 
(1980); Honnold, Uniform Law for International Sales, p. 446, 454; Joseph Lookofsky, The 
1980 United Nations Convention on Contracts for the International Sale of Goods, in J. Herbots 
& R. Blanpain (eds), International Encyclopaedia of Laws - Contracts, Suppl. 29 (December 
2000), 156; Peter Schlechtriem, Uniform Sales Law - The UN-Convention on Contracts for the 
International Sale of Goods (Manz, Vienna: 1986), 98 footnote 398a. 
80  In this case the trouble would be that the damages for ‘loss of volume’ cannot be mitigated by 
definition (once the transaction is avoided, the loss ensues). However, mitigation is not an 
absolute limit, and it is conceivable that there may be situations where damages may not be 
mitigated. See Ramos Muñoz, supra note 74, 98-99; Saidov, supra note 75. 
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must not read article 76 as covering all cases not covered by article 75; and we 
must not read both provisions as comprehensive, but as giving the aggrieved 
party an easy way to calculate his damages, but by no means denying the right to 
other type of damages, provided he can prove them.  
 
In the problem of the twelfth edition of the Vis Moot the issue was the opposite81. 
If above we have analysed the case where there is avoidance but not a substitute 
transaction; in that case the trouble was that the potentially substitute transaction 
was accomplished without the contract having been avoided. The question above 
was whether a different calculation of damages could be made in case of 
avoidance (i.e. whether articles 75 and 76 were exhaustive or comprehensive of 
all the options in case of avoidance). In this other case the question was whether 
the rule for calculation of damages under articles 75 and 76 can apply in the 
absence of avoidance (i.e. whether articles 75 and 76 are of exclusive 
application). 
 
In this case the answer does not require an “exclusion” of the rules and an 
interpretation based on principles. And this because article 74 expresses both a 
principle and a rule; and both articles 75 and 76 are formulated in positive and 
conditional terms (if there is avoidance, the aggrieved party may request damages 
calculated…) which does mean by no means that the exact opposite is true (that if 
there is not avoidance the aggrieved party may not request damages calculated in 
that way). This is supported by scholars such as Professor Schlechtriem82; and 
seems an adequate assessment of the language and spirit of the provisions. 
 
Then the next problem that such situation poses is that the buyer makes several 
purchases, before and after avoiding the contract with the seller. This is typical in 
the market for raw materials, or commodities in general, where purchases can be 
made on a continuous basis. It is also typical that prices fluctuate significantly. 
Take a situation where prices climb up on the days before the contract is avoided, 
and go down afterwards. The seller will have incentives to consider the purchase 
made before as a “substitute transaction”, pursuant to article 75 CISG; whereas 
the seller will argue that the cover purchase is the one made after avoidance, or 
that damages must be calculated in accordance with the “current price” at the 
 
81  http://www.cisg.law.pace.edu/cisg/moot/moot12.pdf 
82  Peter Schlechtriem, ‘Damages, avoidance of the contract and performance interest under the 
CISG’, Festschrift Apostolos Georgiades (Athens 2005). Available at  
http://www.globalsaleslaw.org/__ temp/Schlechtriem_Damages_Avoidance.pdf. 
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time of avoidance, pursuant to article 76 CISG83. This was also the case in the 
above-mentioned moot problem84. 
 
Again, what we see is that, in such cases the multiple possibilities offered by the 
commercial context roll over the tidy and organized setting described in the 
uniform law provisions. And, again, the possibilities for applying the law are 
several: to ignore commercial reality and apply the legal rules as such (this would 
imply excluding the applicability of article 75 CISG in all cases); to rely 
exclusively on the parties’ intention (which would be difficult, considering that 
none of them has expressed a desire to exclude the legal provisions); or to let the 
specificities of the case to the “usages” reference (yet it is hard to characterize the 
commercial context as a “usage”). Finally, there is the possibility that we 
propose, to acknowledge that the commercial context has created a situation that 
requires looking beyond the letter of the law, and applying principles.  
 
In this regard, an interpretation of the principles underlying damages calculation 
would mean weighing full compensation with the duty of mitigation; which, in 
the particular case, would reflect upon the reference price to calculate the amount 
of damages. In principle (1), the aggrieved party has the right to the difference 
between contract price and current price at the moment of avoidance (article 76 
CISG). Then (2), it may happen that the aggrieved party has incurred extra costs, 
or performed the substitute transaction at a bad moment. In such case, it should 
still be entitled to the extra loss suffered, provided it can prove that the 
transaction performed was an actual substitute to the transaction that was 
avoided, no matter whether it was undertaken before or after avoidance. This 
burden of proof would preclude specific damage calculation (i.e. pursuant to the 
actual purchase) when the facts show that the aggrieved buyer simply continued 
in the business of making regular purchases, without making a specific one, and 
is, simply, trying to pick the highest price as a reference. Finally, (3) the specific 
calculation would also be precluded when the conditions of the cover transaction 
are unreasonable85 . This means that the relationship between the rules of 
 
83  Cf Ibid., at 7-8. 
84  In the problem the prices of cocoa went up for several months; and down after the contract was 
avoided. See Twelfth Annual Willem C. Vis International Commercial Arbitration Moot, 
Vienna, Austria March 18 to 24 2005, available at http://www.cisg.law.pace.edu/ 
cisg/moot/moot12.pdf p. 28. 
85  Article 75 CISG. This also constitutes a specific application of the principle of mitigation of 
damages. Article 77 CISG states:  
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calculation of damages according to the cover price and the current price can be 
more complex than it seems. The rule of the cover price takes preference in so far 
as the price is reasonable; but, in assessing that reasonableness, the current price 
acts as a benchmark. Thus, the cover price is given preference, but not allowed to 
widely depart from the current price. 
3.4. The Issue of Multi-Party Relationships 
The previous examples suggest that a symbiotic approach to the relationship 
between commercial context and (uniform) commercial can be greatly beneficial 
in some cases. The examples covered before reflect upon some of the numerous 
instances in which this is so, in the “bi-dimensional” context of bilateral 
relationships. 
 
Yet the biggest challenge for the “symbiotic” approach is in tackling the issue of 
multi-party contexts. In bilateral relationships the specific legal rules may depart 
from underlying assumptions as to the parties’ pattern of behaviour that may be 
contradicted by reality in specific cases. However, on the issue of multi-party 
relationships the whole law of contract is formulated on the assumption that all 
relationships are bilateral, and multi-party relationships constitute a mere 
anomaly that needs to be redirected to the rules crafted to bilateral contracts. 
 
In this regard, the rules on formation of contracts, for example, drafted under the 
assumption of an offer-acceptance structure, do not account for all the 
possibilities that commercial reality offers in bilateral contracts. When we move 
to a multi-party setting, the practical possibilities of interaction of different 
parties at different levels until a consensus (partial or total) is achieved is 
staggering; and would all fall outside the specific rules. In second place, uniform 
law does not address the problem of contract conclusion beyond the issue of 
consent; which fortunately rules out the issues of causa and consideration from 
the debate. Those requirements, present in every domestic law of contracts, are 
one of the clearest manifestations of the assumption of a bilateral setting at the 
very core of contract law. In common law countries, there was the rule that 
consideration had to move from the obligee (thereby eliminating the possibility 
of multi-lateral relationships where each party performed to a party different than 
                                                                                     
A party who relies on a breach of contract must take such measures as are reasonable in 
the circumstances to mitigate the loss, including loss of profit, resulting from the breach. 
If he fails to take such measures, the party in breach may claim a reduction in the damages 
in the amount by which the loss should have been mitigated. 
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the one who performed to it). In civil law countries, the classification of causa 
indicated the assumption of either unilateral (e.g. in a donation) or bilateral 
relationships. Leaving out the issue in unilateral/gratuitous contracts, the 
alternative view of causa saw it as the reciprocal obligation. 
 
Fortunately, as said, causa/consideration is not a requirement under the CISG86, 
or the UPIC or PECL87; which makes uniform commercial law a better breeding 
ground to address the issue of multi-party contracts (or contractual relationships).  
 
However, contract rules applicable to multi-party settings are very limited, and 
reductionist in the sense that they tend to simplify multilateral ties to a bilateral 
mind-set. Agency provisions, for example, are constructed under the assumption 
that the third party has a contract either with the agent or with the principal. 
Third-party beneficiary rules stipulate that a third party acquires rights under a 
contract signed by two other parties, but somehow presume that such third party 
is an outsider, i.e. that the relationship with each of the contracting parties is 
irrelevant for the purposes of the contract and the rights it acquires. Assignment 
of rights/obligations/contracts contemplates the multi-party situation as 
transitional (in the end, the situation evolves towards a two-party relationship). 
Even the rules for multiple obligors/obligees are drafted under the assumption 
that the multiple parties are placed on one or the two sides of the relationship (i.e. 
that there are two sellers and/or two buyers, but still one “selling side” and one 
“buying side”). 
 
The multi-party element creates friction even in cases where the type of 
relationship is not a problem. Take, for example, the case of the seventeenth Vis 
Moot88. The seller was supposed to supply pumps that would be used for an 
irrigation project contracted between the buyer and the local authority of a third 
country. The goods were delivered late and did not comply with domestic 
regulations of the third country; and it was controversial which party bore the 
risk of such regulations. Still, as background the seller faced a situation where the 
 
86  Pursuant to article 23 of the CISG, “A contract is concluded at the moment when an acceptance 
of an offer becomes effective in accordance with the provisions of this Convention”. No 
mention whatsoever is made of other requirements.  
87 Article 2.1.1. UPIC (“A contract may be concluded either by the acceptance of an offer or by 
conduct of the parties that is sufficient to show agreement”), and article 2:101 (1) (“A contract is 
concluded if: (a) the parties intend to be legally bound, and (b) they reach a sufficient agreement 
without any further requirement”) PECL. 
88  http://www.cisg.law.pace.edu/cisg/moot/moot17.pdf 
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contract between the buyer and the third party had been cancelled by the latter; 
which made the seller-buyer contract lose its purpose.  
 
In this case, there was no multi-party contract or relationship. Furthermore, CISG 
rules provide that goods are not conforming unless they are fit for a particular 
purpose made known to the seller. A mechanic application of those rules would 
lead to conclude that the goods were non-conforming since the contract with the 
third party had been cancelled. However, if we acknowledge the commercial 
context it is right to ask whether the mention that the goods would serve a 
“particular purpose” of the contract with the third party was enough to presume 
that the seller would relinquish its rights regarding the seriousness of the breach. 
In other words, if the buyer had not properly questioned the third party right to 
avoid; should the seller just settle with what the buyer did? Did he, by 
acknowledging the “particular purpose” waive its right to object the seriousness 
of the breach? The question is also pertinent in cases of distribution chains where 
the different contracts are subject to different legal rules. Thus, this is a case 
where the commercial context may be partially inconsistent with the provisions 
on avoidance and fundamental breach, but is still insufficient to provide a 
solution. Again, the solution could be in a symbiotic interpretation of that 
commercial context together with the principles underlying the conformity rule, 
the fundamental breach rule, and the rules on incorporation by reference; one that 
allows to calibrate or graduate the way in which the buyer-third party relationship 
has become part of the seller-buyer relationship. 
 
Then, take the problem for the I edition of the Moot Madrid89. The performance 
of the sale of digital TVs was jeopardized by the threats of legal action by a third 
party, who claimed the infringement of intellectual property rights, his and also 
of a software manufacturer. First of all, the way the issue is addressed under the 
CISG, the focus is on the of intellectual property law of the buyer’s country, and 
whether the seller should have been aware or not. It does not consider the 
dimension of the party making the claim, and how it may affect the buyer-seller 
relationship. Furthermore, as part of its request of specific performance the buyer 
requested the seller to settle the matter of potential infringement with the 
software manufacturer, by obtaining a letter or public statement certifying that 
the software was different; which raises the question of how the remedy of 
specific performance works when third parties are involved.  
 
 
89  http://www.mootmadrid.es/moot2009/caso/Caso%20Moot%20Español-REV-2.pdf. 
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In third place, take the problem of the ninth edition of the Vis Moot90. It was an 
(apparently straightforward) relationship of assignment, were the receivables 
under the contract of sale had been transferred to a bank by the seller. The “pure” 
assignment issues were not too problematic: there was no gap in the rules. Yet 
there was also the issue of notification of defects. The CISG requires that, in 
order for the buyer to exercise its remedies, it must notify the seller specifying 
the defects within a reasonable time91. In the case, it was arguable whether the 
buyer communicated the defects properly to the seller. But there was no doubt 
that the buyer had not notified the assignee, at least not in time. Since the CISG is 
drafted under the assumption of a buyer-seller relationship it does not cover 
buyer-assignee matters. On the one hand, there is the reference to the “seller”, 
plus the principle of debtor protection, i.e. that the assignment cannot result in a 
higher burden for the debtor92. On the other hand, it could be argued that the 
policies underlying the duty to notify (to give the other party an opportunity to 
cure, to permit the other party to request evidence to decide whether it was its 
responsibility and or allow it to prepare for further litigation…) could not be 
properly fulfilled unless the notice was given to the assignee (for the seller had 
become insolvent). None of these issues is addressed under uniform contract 
rules. 
 
Finally, if the above are cases where the relationship is properly characterized in 
the law, but the legal rules are unsuited to solve the problems, there are cases 
where not even the relationship can be properly characterized. The Vis Moot 
problem of the sixteenth edition93 involved a sale of cars. The seller was the 
subsidiary of a multi-national car manufacturer, and signed the contract in its 
own name. Then, however, the cars began malfunctioning; and the buyer 
requested repair. At that moment, the parent company of the seller stepped in, 
and the communications were primarily maintained with it. After the subsidiary 
became insolvent the buyer sued the parent. 
 
 
90  http://www.cisg.law.pace.edu/cisg/moot/moot9.pdf. 
91  Article 39 (1) CISG. 
92  Article 15 of the UNCITRAL Convention on the Assignment of Receivables in International 
Trade provides that  
Except as otherwise provided in this Convention, an assignment does not, without the 
consent of the debtor, affect the rights and obligations of the debtor, including the 
payment terms contained in the original contract. 
93  http://www.cisg.law.pace.edu/cisg/moot/moot16.pdf. 
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The immediate discussion focused on whether the case complied with the test to 
establish a third-party benefit, or whether it was a case of undisclosed agency, or 
a contract with a plurality of obligors. But the really troubling matter was that it 
could be characterized as any of those relationships. It could be argued that 
parent and subsidiary had an implicit understanding by which when problems 
arose with the latter, the former stepped in; a contract for the benefit of third 
parties. It could be characterized as an agency relationship, probably an 
undisclosed one. Also as a case of plurality of obligors, etc. At the same time, it 
had distinct elements of its own. Regarding third-party rights, it was hard to show 
the existence of a prior “contract” between the seller and its parent that created 
the rights in favour of the buyer. For agency it was problematic that the “agent” 
did not say anything about the principal, then the principal entered the stage, but 
the agent did not vanish, but was also put in copy in subsequent communications. 
From the perspective of “plurality of obligors” rules, the problem was that the 
seller and its parent did not perform the same obligation. They did different 
things, but to achieve a single purpose. 
 
In such case the “principled” interpretation we propose would lead to assess the 
existence of a multi-party relationship from the perspective of consent, without 
being influenced by the categories contemplated in the law; each embodying its 
own set of assumptions (and, consequently, prejudices). Beyond that, 
establishing the rights and obligations of the parties in such setting is a matter 
that exceeds the scope of this work.  
 
In this regard, even in cases where the uniform law legislator has attempted to 
codify the parties’ rights in multi-party contexts the combination of a proper 
appraisal of the commercial context with a symbiotic approach that combines this 
with a principles-based interpretation is necessary. Take the case of the II edition 
of the Moot Madrid94. That case involves a lease, where the supplier is a 
manufacturer of machinery, the lessee is a manufacturer of car parts (among 
other things) and the lessor is a leasing company, not financial, and with a 
different approach. This approach is seen in the fact that it does not uncritically 
accept the selection of a supplier by the lessee, but gives its opinion; and is kept 
updated on the development of the relationship, and intervenes with some 
exchange of communications with the supplier. These elements are sufficient to 
question the characterization of the relationship as a financial lease. Yet on the 
 
94 http://www.mootmadrid.es/caso/Caso%20Moot%20Madrid%202010%20con%20aclaraciones. 
pdf 
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other hand, the Ottawa Convention on Financial Leasing 1988 95 , and the 
UNIDROIT Model Law on Leasing 200896; both potentially applicable in the 
case, are based on that sharp distinction. However, neither the lessor’s attitude 
does not correspond to the “aloofness” presumed under the rules on financial 
leases, nor does the supplier vanish from the picture (as presumed of non-
financial leases).  
 
Furthermore, a triangular relationship such as the one envisaged in this case, 
creates all sorts of problems for the existing law. The most evident is in the 
lessee’s rights against the supplier. In a financial lease, the lessee can supposedly 
exercise all rights as if it were the lessor97. Supposedly its obligations towards the 
lessor are independent from the relationship with the supplier98. Yet when it 
comes to avoidance, the lessee cannot avoid the supply contract unilaterally 
(even in case of fundamental breach) without the lessor’s permission. Then, what 
happens in case there is a fundamental breach but the lessor does not give 
permission? And what avoidance would look like in such tri-lateral setting? Is 
there room for the lessee to exercise, or request a retention of payment as a 
means to put pressure on the supplier?  
 
All of these matters can hardly be contemplated under a single set of rules; at 
least for the time being. Yet the complexity and sophistication of modern 
commercial transactions makes it predictable that these problems (or other 
problems we cannot even envisage yet) will present themselves without prior 
warning. In all these cases we anticipate that the “symbiotic” solution proposed 
here should be the guideline. 
 
95  See UNIDROIT Convention on International Financial Leasing (Ottawa, 28 May 1988). 
Available at http://www.unidroit.org/english/conventions/1988leasing/main.htm. In particular, 
see article 1 (2) for the definition of financial lease employed by the Convention. 
96 See UNIDROIT Model Law on Leasing. Available at  
http://www.unidroit.org/english/modellaws/2008leasing/main.htm. In particular, see the 
definition of “Financial Lease” in Article 2; and articles 7, 9-14, 16 and 17 for the effects of the 
distinction between financial and non-financial lease  
97  Article 10 (1) of the Convention on Financial Lease; and articles 7 and 14 (1) of the UNIDROIT 
Model Law on Leasing. 
98  Article 8 (1) (a) Convention on International Financial Leasing, article 10 (1) (a) UNIDROIT 
Model Law on Leasing. 
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4. CONCLUSIONS 
In the present work we have presented the current state of uniform law for 
commercial contracts as it is now. The law allows for much flexibility and gives 
much room for the parties’ will to operate. Yet we believe that the way it does so 
suffers from two main limitations. First, it does not acknowledge the 
“commercial context” unless it can be characterized as a “usage”, a “practice” or 
“the parties intention”. Second, it embodies a “competitive” relationship between 
the parties’ intention, within their commercial context (the latter rebranded as 
usage, practice, etc) on one side, and the legal rules on the other. The traditional 
interpretation of uniform law provisions has tended to enhance this view, 
restrictive on one side, and competitive on the other. 
 
We believe this fails to grasp the complexity of modern commercial relations. In 
particular, it fails to account for the innumerable occasions where the commercial 
context shows some friction, or plain inconsistency with the assumptions made in 
the legal provisions; and yet such context does not supply sufficient elements to 
make a just and reasonable decision, i.e. it is incomplete.  
 
Instead, in this work we propose a “symbiotic” approach. Its first implication is 
that commercial context must be acknowledged in its full measure. Second, once 
that context is acknowledged, and given that its inconsistency with the legal 
assumptions underlying specific provisions prevents a mechanic application of 
the rules, the factual input from the context must be processed under a principles-
based interpretation of uniform law. Whenever the uniform law provisions are 
flexible enough, this can be done without departing from such provisions. 
Whenever it is not possible, a gap can be acknowledged, and the principles-based 
approach would be based on the gap-filling rules that call for an autonomous 
interpretation. 
 
As can be seen, neither the importance of elements outside the legal provisions, 
nor the autonomous, principles-based interpretation are new. What we believe 
our approach offers is a joint mechanism to tackle these two great issues of 
uniform law, and link them together to create more flexible solutions without 
losing predictability. It is for that reason that we have made a particular emphasis 
on the practical applications of this mechanism. 
 
Naturally, this approach cannot be possible without the proper players at the 
helmet, hence the importance of legal education, to ensure that lawyers and 
judges do not only understand the law, and acknowledge the importance of the 
Liber Amicorum Eric Bergsten 
810 
commercial context, but to that they can also combine both in a proper way. In 
this regard, the task of Professor Bergsten as conductor of the Willem C Vis 
International Commercial Arbitration Moot for seventeen years has greatly 
exceeded its original mandate. From a mechanism to spread the study of the 
CISG it has turned into an agent for changing the way it can be applied; and that 
through discussion and debate, by asking the question nobody has asked before. 
In this sense, this work would not have been possible without the inspiration that 
the Moot cases provide. Nor would the cases of our Moot Madrid exist without 
this great precedent, which set such a high bar.  
 
It is for these reasons that this article is dedicated to Professor Bergsten. For 
being a great teacher, for challenging the boundaries of the law, and for helping 
our ingenuity with new sources of inspiration, in the past and for the years to 
come. 
